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AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
I. PANEL: CONSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW OF POST-9/11 BARRIERS TO
FREE SPEECH AND A FREE PRESS
A. Nadine Strossen"
I am delighted to chime in on this fascinating conversation about
overview principles, and I would like to start by responding to a
couple of the ideas that have been presented. First, with respect to
the constitutional text, I take a somewhat different approach from
the fascinating one that Dean Rodney Smolla set out. I think there is
great significance to what the Constitution does say and what it does
not say about special emergency powers, war powers, and so forth.
Our Constitution's Framers did not include a general emergency
provision of the sort that Dean Claudio Grossman talked about,
which is characteristic of not only international and regional human
rights treaties, but also the constitutions of other modern
democracies. Those treaties and constitutions provide very stringent
preconditions and strict judicial review for the exercise of emergency
power.
In contrast, I think it is striking that our Framers made an
apparently deliberate decision to include no general emergency
exception whatsoever to the usual constitutional framework for
limiting government powers and securing individual rights. I think it
is apparent that this was an intentional decision because the Framers
did include one very specific emergency exception. That one
exception allows Congress, under very narrow circumstances, limited
to "Cases of Rebellion or Invasion," to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus "when ... the public Safety may require it."' The fact that this
"Suspension Clause" imposes such strict constraints upon the specific
emergency exception that it authorizes bolsters the inference that
there is no textual justification for a general emergency exception.
It is not so interesting that I, the ACLU President, reached that
conclusion; that should not be surprising. I think it is far more
interesting and surprising that the Supreme Court stressed that
conclusion in its first post-9/11 decision, in Hamdi v. Runsfeld.2 I had
been very nervous about what this Supreme Court was going to do
post-9/ 1. In the Vietnam era, the Supreme Court did not decide
these kinds of cases. The most recent litigated situation was from
* President, American Civil Liberties Union; Professor of Law, New York Law
School; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1975; A.B., Harvard College, 1972.
1. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2.
2. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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World War II, where the Court pays lip service to applying strict
scrutiny, and yet at the same time allows blatant racial discrimination
and incarceration without demanding any evidence from the
government: This shows that regardless of how strictly the tests are
formulated, they can always be manipulated or paid lip service.
Moreover, the Bush Administration argued that there should be no
judicial review at all of its assertions of seemingly boundless executive
power in the name of the "War on Terror." The Administration
maintained that the Court should not hear any of these cases, and its
fallback position was that if the Court did hear the cases, it should
apply the rubber-stamping-type deference of the sort that we had
seen in the past. So, although Hamdi was hardly a perfect decision
from a civil libertarian's perspective, it was such an enormous relief
given the historical background. I could not agree more with both of
my co-panelists that over time there has been an evolution of more
judicial protection, for more individual rights, in more
circumstances, including emergency circumstances.
What I thought was particularly striking was that, of all the different
opinions in the Hamdi case, the one that most strongly stood up for
individual rights protected by courts, even in times of emergency, was
the dissent authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, with the strange
bedfellow of Justice John Paul Stevens joining the opinion.4 This is
also very encouraging. That the Court's most outspoken conservative
joined the Court's most outspoken liberal shows that these issues of
individual liberty and checks against government abuses of power do
not fall along the usual ideological or partisan political divides. One
of the points that the Scalia-Stevens opinion heavily stressed was the
point that I noted earlier, that the Constitution itself provides only
one exception for only one right in times of war: Congress's power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
Dean Rodney Smolla stopped talking about precedents somewhere
around the late-1960s, or perhaps at the beginning of the 1970s, so
he did not talk about what I think is the most important precedent
5for free speech protection in times of war, the Pentagon Papers case.
That case took place in 1971, while the United States was still
engaged in the Vietnam War. The Nixon Administration made very
serious claims about how publishing the Pentagon Papers would
undermine the war effort and national security. Notably, these claims
were accepted by not only the dissenting Justices, but also two Justices
3. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
4. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
5. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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in the majority. All five of these Justices accepted the
Administration's claims that there would be a series of specific harms
that would occur through the publication of the Pentagon Papers,
including killing of American soldiers overseas and interference with
diplomatic efforts to end the war. There is a very short so-called "per
curiam opinion" for the Court as a whole, followed by nine separate
opinions. Although a majority of five Justices actually agreed with the
government's assertion that the publication of these papers would
lead to enormous harms, including undermining national security,
six Justices still voted against restricting freedom of speech in that
case.
As other commentators, including Dean Rodney Smolla and
Professor Thomas Healy, have suggested, even though the tests for
various kinds of free speech restrictions are formulated somewhat
differently, they essentially are all variations on the theme of strict
scrutiny. Therefore, while the Pentagon Papers case specifically
addresses prior restraints, and while Brandenburg v. Ohi06 specifically
addresses incitement, they both use versions of strict judicial scrutiny.
The details of the Court's analytical framework in each of these
particular factual contexts may be different, but the overall concept is
the same. Any restriction on freedom of speech is presumptively
unconstitutional, and the government must bear a very heavy burden
of proof, an appropriately heavy burden of proof, to overcome that
presumption of unconstitutionality.
Strict scrutiny is, of course, a two-part test. First, the government
must show that there is an interest of compelling importance.
Second, the government must show that the restriction is narrowly
tailored, indeed necessary, in order to protect or promote that
compelling interest, which in the post-9/11 situation is national
security. The courts often say that the government has to use the
least restrictive alternative. If it could promote national security
without such a heavy invasion into First Amendment freedoms, then
the government has to use that less restrictive alternative.
One thing that I like about this strict scrutiny test is that it reflects
just plain common sense. After all, why should the government get
the power to restrict our freedom if it is not necessary, if the
government could effectively promote our national security with less
of an invasion on our freedom? Why should we sacrifice freedom
when that sacrifice is not necessary to promote national security?
That would not be a logical tradeoff. Therefore, I especially
6. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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appreciate one of the recommendations from the unanimous report
of the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States, commonly known as the Citizens' Commission on
9/11, which essentially said that this form of strict judicial scrutiny
should be used as a matter of good common sense, good policy, and
7good governance.
The first prong of that test is very easy to satisfy. It was easy to
satisfy in the Pentagon Papers case, and it is easy to satisfy post-9/11:
protecting national security is a compelling interest. Where the
rubber hits the road, and where the debate occurs, regards that
second prong: is this measure actually necessary? In addressing the
second prong, we should consider that many of the measures that are
touted as advancing national security have been criticized, including
by national security experts, as not even being effective, let alone
necessary. Worse yet, too many such measures are even
counterproductive to national security, according to national
security experts. These concerns specifically apply to many of the
post-911 First Amendment restrictions.
These kinds of considerations were cited in a number of the
separate opinions in the Pentagon Papers case. As several Justices
observed in that case, national security and freedom of speech go
hand in hand. When the government denies the public access to
information, which is the common theme of so many of the First
Amendment violations we are fighting now, it actually undermines
national security. Let us consider a few of the statements that the
Supreme Court issued in this vein in the Pentagon Papers case,
because it is the leading precedent. These statements are completely
applicable to the current situation. I hope that when these issues get
to the Supreme Court, the Court will be guided by these kinds of
statements. Justice Hugo Black wrote: "The guarding of military and
diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative
government provides no real security for our Republic."8  As
Congressman Scott noted earlier, even Congress cannot get basic
information from the current Administration, and our elected
representatives cannot make rational and informed decisions about
national security if they do not get this basic information.
Justice William 0. Douglas expanded on this core insight by noting
that our elected representatives cannot and will not correct their
mistakes so long as the mistakes remain hidden under a veil of
7. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 394-95 (2004).
8. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 719.
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secrecy imposed for the asserted purpose of promoting national
security, but that really had a completely different purpose.9
Government officials are perennially tempted to use government
secrecy to cover-up embarrassing information, which we saw when
one of my heroes, Coleen Rowley, blew the whistle on cover-ups of
mistakes and misconduct in the FBI. Cautioning against such abuse
in his opinion in the Pentagon Papers case, Justice Douglas wrote,
"Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic,
perpetuating bureaucratic errors... °  He goes on to say, "The
dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the
widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing
information."" In light of history, we have to be alert to the pattern
of how and why the government actually uses its powers to impose
secrecy. Is the power used to protect "We the People," or is it really a
cover-up for mistakes or misconduct by government officials?
Justice Potter Stewart's opinion in the Pentagon Papers case
contained the most subtle, and I think the most intriguing, argument
about the negative interrelationship between government secrecy and
national security. He explained that a system of excessive secrecy
quickly deteriorates into one, seemingly paradoxically, of inadequate
secrecy. As he stated:
When everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the
system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical ... and to be
manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion..
. [T] he hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would
be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can
best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained.
12
These general insights about the positive impact that reducing
secrecy has on national security were specifically endorsed by the
bipartisan Citizens' Commission on 9/11. The Commission
determined that unjustified government secrecy, including over-
classification, had undermined national security pre-9/11. It
suggested that if more information had been more widely shared, not
only among government agencies, but also with the public, the press,
and Congress, then there would have been a greater chance of
connecting the dots, potentially even averting the terrible tragedy on
9/11. Therefore, moving forward, in the interest of preventing
another such catastrophe, the 9/11 Commission expressly
9. Id. at 720-24 (Douglas,J., concurring).
10. Id. at 724.
11. Id. at 723-24.
12. Id. at 729 (StewartJ, concurring).
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recommended more government openness. It said, "Secrecy stifles
oversight, accountability, and informatiorii sharing. Unfortunately, all
the current organizational incentives encourage over-classification.
This balance should change ....",i I have to underscore that this
recommendation was made not in the spirit of promoting civil
liberties, which is the ACLU's mandate, but rather in the spirit of
promoting national security. In short, this is a vivid example of the
mutually reinforcing relationship between First Amendment
freedoms and national security.
Some of the Justices' individual opinions in the Pentagon Papers
case recognize another fundamental constitutional principle at stake.
Protecting the free flow of information and countering undue
government secrecy are essential underpinnings, not only of
individual freedom, but also of our whole government system of
checks and balances. A free press that has access to, and the right to
publish information about Executive Branch policies, is a critical
pillar of both congressional oversight and judicial review. Conversely,
when the Executive Branch stifles or withholds information from the
other branches of government, as well as from the public, that
corrodes our fundamental political system, as well as individual
freedom. Unfortunately, this is exactly what the Executive Branch
has been doing since 9/11, as Congressman Scott lamented. In fact,
this Administration has been so stubborn in refusing to provide basic
information to Congress, and so disdainful of Congress's requests for
information, that it has earned the criticism of even conservative
Republicans, who substantively support the Administration's policies.
As they complain, the Administration's withholding of information
undermines their ability to perform their essential functions as our
elected representatives, including their responsibilities to maintain
oversight of the Executive Branch.
In my limited time, I would like to mention two illustrations of this
vital interrelationship between the First Amendment freedoms and
our government system of checks and balances. I am going to focus
on the courts because under the structure of the Constitution, the
courts are designed to serve as the ultimate safety net, especially at
times of crisis when the branches of government that are politically
accountable tend to be timorous and to act based on expediency
rather than principle.
13. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report
_Exec.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).
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As I previously mentioned, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many
federal judges fortunately have ruled in favor of the ACLU's cases
that challenge abuses of government power and defend individual
liberty, including freedom of speech. The first illustration is one very
important victory that we won exactly two weeks ago today, when a
federal judge struck down a provision of the Patriot Act under both
the First Amendment and a separation of powers principle, 4
specifically the judicial review powers introduced by Marbury v.
Madison.15 In Doe v. Gonzales, 6 Judge Victor Marrero of the U.S
District Court for the Southern District of New York quoted from
Marbury v. Madison repeatedly in his opinion invalidating the section
of the Patriot Act that authorizes secret surveillance under National
Security Letters or "NSL's." This provision imposed gag orders on all
Internet Service Providers, librarians and others who receive NSL's
seeking information about their patrons' communications. Judge
Marrero struck down this provision specifically because of its tight
constraints on judicial review. He stressed the vital interrelationship
between the judicial review power and the First Amendment
freedoms that the NSL provision violated. For example, Judge
Marrero wrote:
The Constitution was designed so that the dangers of any given
moment would never suffice as justification for discarding
fundamental individual liberties or circumscribing the judiciary's
unique role under our governmental system in protecting those
liberties and upholding the rule of law. It is the judiciary's
independent function to uphold the Constitution even if to do so
may mean curtailing Congress's efforts to confer greater freedom
on the executive to investigate national security threats."
In short, through the power of judicial review, Judge Marrero was
able to enforce both First Amendment rights and the judicial review
power itself, reinforcing the positive interrelationship between them.
As a second illustration of the relationship between the First
Amendment and judicial review, let me give you an example of the
dark side, the glass half-empty perspective. It shows how the judicial
review power can be thwarted through undue Executive Branch
secrecy, thus undermining both checks and balances and First
Amendment freedoms. I am specifically referring to how judicial
review power has been completely frustrated to an alarming extent by
14. Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
15. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
16. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379.
17. Id. at 414-15.
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the government's abuse of, and many courts' acceptance of, the "state
secrets privilege." As a result, the Executive Branch has effectively
been immunized from any judicial review of even the most egregious
violations of constitutional rights, including First Amendment
freedoms. Such abuses are analyzed in the powerful new report put
together by James Tucker and his ACLU colleagues, which refers to
such acts as "governing in the shadows."'' 8 While this topic is not as
well known as it should be, Louis Fisher has written a book on this
subject, In the Name of National Security,'9 which I recommend to you.
In its origin, the state secrets privilege was designed to protect
particular pieces of evidence that were shown to be dangerous to
national security if they came to light. That narrow application has
been completely expanded, distorted, and exaggerated, so the
privilege is now being used systematically to completely dismiss cases
before the introduction of any evidence, even cases claiming
enormous abuses of the most fundamental human rights, including
rendition to countries that we know engage in torture.
This has become such a serious problem that, after considerable
deliberation and risk analysis, the ACLU decided to ask the United
States Supreme Court to review this issue in two cases, one of which
directly involved the First Amendment.20 The ACLU reached this
decision because we believe that the overblown use of the state
secrets privilege is such a serious threat to all freedoms, including
First Amendment rights. Further, we believe that there is a likelihood
that the Supreme Court, being part of an independent branch of
government with an investment in defending checks and balances,
will re-examine and cut back on the abuse of this privilege to
undermine both individual rights and the judicial review power to
enforce individual rights. Let me read just the closing lines in one of
the ACLU's briefs seeking Supreme Court review of this issue, to give
you a flavor of what is at stake. Under cover of the government's
distorted, exaggerated view of the state secrets privilege, our brief
writes,
... [T]he government may engage in torture, declare it a state
secret, and by virtue of that designation avoid any judicial
18. JAMES THOMAS TUCKER & SOPHIE ALCORN, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
RECLAIMING OUR RIGHTS: DECLARATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND GRIEvANCES
2 (2007), http://www.aclu.org/symposium/reclaiming-our-rights.pdf.
19. Louis FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006).
20. EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 373
(2007); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 323 F.Supp.2d 65 (D.D.C.), affid 161 Fed.
App'x. 6 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 46 U.S. 1031 (2005).
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accountability for conduct that even the government purports to
condemn as unlawful under all circumstances. Under a system
predicated on respect for the rule of law, the government has no
privilege to violate our most fundamental legal norms, and it
should not be able to do so with impunity based on a state secrets
privilege that was developed to achieve very different ends.2 ,
In conclusion, I would like to return to the Pentagon Papers case,
the leading case on press freedom, the First Amendment, and
national security. I would like to quote the federal trial judge who
issued the first opinion in the case, Judge Murray Gurfein of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York. I think it is
very notable that he was a former prosecutor who had a significant
background in military intelligence. It is especially noteworthy that,
with that background, Judge Gurfein strongly rejected the
government's claims that First Amendment principles should yield to
national security concerns, rejecting the notion that these are
antithetical concepts. As he declared:
The security of the Nation is not at the ramparts alone. Security
also lies in the value of our free institutions. A cantankerous press,
an obstinate press, an ubiquitous press must be suffered by those in
authority in order to preserve the even greater values of freedom of
expression and the right of the people to know. ... Yet in the last
analysis it is not merely the opinion of the editorial writer or of the
columnist which is protected by the First Amendment. It is the free
flow of information so that the public will be informed about the
Government and its actions.23
II. PANEL: RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION THROUGH
MATERIAL SUPPORT PROHIBITIONS AND VISA DENIALS
A. David Cole
I am delighted to be here at the Washington College of Law, one of
the nation's leaders in fighting for human fights and educating on
the subject of human rights. I am also honored to be on a panel with
representatives of the American Civil Liberties Union and PEN
American Center. One of my first cases as a young lawyer at the
Center for Constitutional Rights was working with PEN American
21. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, E1-Masri, 128 S. Ct. 373 (No. 06-1613).
22. United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.) rev'd en banc per
curiam, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
23. Id. at 331.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, J.D., Yale Law School, 1984;
B.A., Yale University, 1980.
